After the Asia crisis of 1997-98, policymakers invested much energy in designing a new international financial architecture. However many of the policy proposals which have emerged from think tanks and the multilateral agencies have proven unworkable or politically unpalatable. The debate focuses on state-led initiatives. But the assumption that public policy is by definition an output of public institutions is difficult to sustain in an era of global change. This article considers specialised forms of intelligence-gathering and judgement-determination which seem increasingly important as sources of governance in this era of financial market volatility: the major bond rating agencies, Moody's Investors Service and Standard and Poor's. More specifically, we examine a proposal of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to reform the existing capital adequacy framework by incorporating banks' own internal ratings and external bond ratings from the rating agencies, in order to calculate bank risk-weighted capital requirements. The article identifies a series of negative implications from the use of private rating agencies as a substitute for state -based regulation, premised on the organisational incentives that shape the ratings industry. Cementing these organisational incentives into the emerging financial architecture will, we argue, lead to negative social and economic consequences.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most political scientists spend their time studying obviously political phenomena like elections, political parties and parliamentary debates. 1 We offer a political reinterpretation of what are more usually thought of as mundane entities and processes in the world of global finance. In this article, we argue that the major debt rating agencies, Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) and Standard and Poor's (S&P) serve to privatise policy-making, narrowing the legitimate sphere of government intervention. More specifically, we suggest recent efforts to incorporate the outputs of the rating agencies into plans to make global finance less volatile are flawed, and likely to generate unexpected, unwanted outcomes.
We have organised this paper in five parts. In the next section, we examine the key dynamics of the new global finance and some of the main characteristics of the rating agencies. In the section that follows, we investigate public-private linkages, as exemplified by the rating agencies. Subsequently, we focus on one aspect of the emerging international financial architecture, namely the new Basel proposals on capital adequacy (Basel II), which mandate incorporating bond ratings into the international regulation of global finance. The criticisms of the current proposal and an alternative agenda are identified. The part following examines the political economy of Basel II, identifying who wins and who loses from the proposal. This analysis identifies the private interests blocking the process and examines their motivations.
II. GLOBAL FINANCE AND THE RATING AGENCIES
The rating agencies operate in what Sinclair has called the New Global Finance (or NGF) (Sinclair 2000) . The NGF amounts to a new form of social organisation of money and finance (Cohen 1996) .
Most of us are familiar with bank lending (Sinclair 1994a and 1994b) . Banks traditionally acted as financial intermediaries, bringing together borrowers and lenders. They borrowed money, in the form of deposits, and lent money at their own risk to borrowers. However, in recent years disintermediation has occurred on both sides of the balance sheet. Borrowers have increasingly obtained money from non-bank sources. By the mid -1990s, mutual funds, which sweep depositors' money directly into financial markets, contained around $2 trillion in assets, not much less than the $2.7 trillion held in US bank deposits (The Economist 1994, 11) . The reasons for this development lie in the heightened competitive pressures generated by globalization, and the high overhead costs of banks ( The Economist 1992) . For their part, banks and other financial institutions increasingly bypass depositors and borrow funds directly in the capital markets.
Disintermediation is a key feature of the NGF. Disintermediation changes the role of banks and creates an information problem in the capital markets. In banking, lenders can depend on the prudential behaviour of banks to preserve their wealth. However, with disintermediation there is an adverse selection problem, because lenders must make judgements about whether borrowers will repay them or not. Given the costs of gathering information with which to make a creditworthiness judgement, institutions have developed to generate economies of scale and provide centralised judgements on the ability and willingness of borrowers to repay their obligations.
Bond rating agencies developed first in the US. From around 1850 until World War I, there was considerable growth in private information provision for the American financial markets. Poor's American Railroad Journal appeared in mid -century. In 1868, Poor's produced the Manual of the Railroads of the United States. By the early 1880s, this publication had 5,000 subscribers (Kirkland 1961, 233) . John Moody first began publishing his Manual of Industrial Statistics in 1900. It proved to be a "gold mine" for Moody (Ibid ., 234 (Smith and Sylla 1993, 42) . New rating firms appeared to compete with Moody's, and the rating processes themselves were extensively elaborated. During the 1930s, rating became a standard requirement for the sale of any issue in the US after many state governments incorporated rating standards into their prudential rules for investment by pension funds. A series of defaults by major sovereign borrowers in the 1930s narrowed the bond business largely to US firms and government agencies until the 1980s. This period was dominated by American blue chip industrial firms (Toffler 1990, 43-57) .
Rating agencies share a number of characteristics with the Law Merchant of the middle ages. The
Law Merchant developed as a way of enforcing contracts by making judgements on trade disputes and keeping records of these actions available for scrutiny by merchants engaging in intra-European trade. This mechanism backed-up merchants when their names were not well known to potential new trade partners in geographically distant places (Milgrom et al. 1990; Cutler 1998) . Rating agencies are also responsible for keeping an eye on who is violating the norms of financial and commercial practice. What is interesting here is that such an ancient form of market governance should, in the contemporary form of rating agencies, once again assume such prominence. image and become more transparent and willing to justify their ratings. This latter strategy may be more to do with reducing market and public expectations about rating than actually improving the rating product.
III. PUBLIC-RPIVATE RELATIONS
Public utlisation of ratings in U.S. regulation goes back over seventy years (BIS 2000, p. 54) . The Depression, the consequent sharp decline of credit quality, and the problems for domestic financial institutions it brought about led the US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) to rule that bank holdings of publicly rated bonds had to be 'BBB' or better to be carried on bank balance sheets at their face or book value. Otherwise the bonds were to be written down to market value, imposing losses on the banks (Cantor and Packer 1994, 6 The initiative to make the NRSRO status more transparent reflects the intensified competitive conditions of the global economy and concerns over barriers to entry. In these conditions, state intervention is generally becoming more codified, institutionalised and juridified. Rules tend to be more elaborate and formal, with fewer tacit understandings (Moran 1991, 13) . This tendency tends to devolve state activities onto nominally private institutions, like the rating agencies, which now find themselves increasingly part of disclosure rules, and sets the terms in which these institutions operate (Ibid ., 14). Self-regulation of this type is a way for the formal political system to distance itself from the increasing uncertainty characteristic of markets in globalized conditions. The latest example of this tendency is the Basel II capital adequacy proposals which mandate the use of rating agency outputs for less sophisticated banks.
IV. A REQUIEM FOR BASEL II
Traditionally, banking supervision has relied on bank examiners to test the quality of a bank's assets (Stevens 2000) . The growth of cross-border financial flows combined with a series of domestic and international shocks during the 1970s and 1980s exposed the weakness of this form of supervision.
One study documents as many as eighty-six episodes of banking insolvency in sixty-nine countries between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, as banking crises hit the developed and developing countries alike (Caprio and Klingebiel 1997) . While some of these banking crises were isolated to the country in which they occurred, many of these crises were international in character and threatened the stability of the international financial system, such as the Latin American debt crisis.
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Policymakers recognized that increased competition among financial institutions combined with government-sponsored deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort facilities were creating incentives for banks to take on greater risk than was optimal, the so-called moral hazard problem. An international agreement was required to allow better supervision of internationally -active banks in order to create a level playing field among different jurisdictions. In response to this systemic failure, the G-10 central banks sat down under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and formulated the 1988 Basle Capital Accord. 3 The 1988 Accord sets out standards to address credit risk --the main risk incurred by banks -by agreeing common minimum capital standards for all banks operating in G-10 countries. 4 The accord consists of two main sections, with the first outlining the definition of capital and the second elaborating a system of risk weights used to calculate the minimum capital applied to each asset class. 5 The idea behind the accord is simply that a bank's capital should be commensurate with the riskiness of its business (Stevens 2000) . Capital is divided into two categories. Primary or Tier 1 capital consists of the amounts paid -in by shareholders, including retained earnings. Secondary or Tier 2 capital includes certain classes of preferred shares and subordinated debt obligations. The accord set the minimum level of bank capital at 8 per cent of the risk-adjusted exposure of assets, of which Tier 1 capital must make-up at least half of this amount. 6 While the 1988 Accord addressed a number of key shortcomings plaguing the supervision of international banking, the politics surrounding negotiation of the accord and the actions taken by private -sector actors following its release quickly undermined the accord's effectiveness. 7 Oatley
and Nabors (1998) document the politics of the negotiations, and view the accord as an example of a redistributive agreement promoted by U.S. politicians that provided domestic rents at the expense of foreign banks. As their discussion details, G-10 policymakers outside the U.S. did not believe their commercial banks needed higher capital requirements -only the U.S. commercial banks were overleveraged with risky assets. The Germans in particular opposed international regulation because their universal banking system would be disadvantaged relative to other players in the international capital markets. Similarly, Japanese banks lobbied to have special treatment of their equity holdings for capital purposes. For their part, private sector actors responded to the incentives in the accord in a fashion that increased, rather than diminished, the riskiness of their loan portfolios. Banks pursued lending and securitization activities designed to reduce the impact of binding capital requirements, by taking risky assets off-balance sheet through securitization and by loading up on the riskier assets within each risk category --a practice termed cherry-picking (Stevens 2000) . 8 Finally, the nature of the BIS meant that the 1988 Accord did not apply to non-bank financial institutions such as investment dealers, insurance companies and asset managers. These actors successfully resisted regulators' efforts to impose minimum capital standards under the auspices of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, distorting the playing field among international financial actors (Porter 1993 ).
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The new capital -adequacy framework introduced in June 1999 (and modified in January 2001) was designed to address these shortcomings (Bank for International Settlements 1999 and 2001a). The first pillar of the new proposal replaces the arbitrary risk-weights with a more refined assessment of credit risk and addresses a wider set of risks involved in bank lending. This proposal puts more weight on private sector assessments of riskiness, and gives credit for the use of risk mitigation techniques. More significantly, the proposal extends the scope of the accord to include banking supervision under a second pillar and the risk management practices of banks under a third pillar. Taken together, these three pillars of the new capital adequacy proposal are expected to enhance the soundness of the financial system, and provide a more level playing field while putting more reliance on private actors active in international financial markets.
The new accord, dubbed Basel II, would replace the 1988 Capital Adequacy Accord, which was found to have a number of faults. In particular, the favourable risk weightings assigned to proposes a wide range of disclosure initiatives that would enhance the effective use of market discipline to encourage sound banking practices.
We assume here that non-metropolitan and most emerging market/developing country banks will be subject to rating agency review rather than their own internal ratings. Our view is that further incorporating these de facto or quasi-regulatory institutions into de jure regulation will produce perverse outcomes for the financial markets and global public policy. We make eight points in support of this negative appraisal of these nascent private makers of global public policy:
1. Rating agencies are pro-cyclical. The primary difficulty with basing the capital allocation of banks on credit ratings is that these same ratings have been found to be pro-cyclical (International Monetary Fund, 1999, 121; Karacadag and Taylor, 2000, 27; Fight, 2001, 187-197) . While the rating agencies claim to rate firms 'through-the -cycle', in practice their ratings Banks which use external ratings for allocating capital will always have the least amount of capital put aside at the point when they need it most, when the business cycle is about to turn and non-performing assets are set to rise. A downturn in the business cycle will cause the ratings on firms to deteriorate, forcing banks to put aside greater capital at the worst possible time when the economy is heading into recession. Should ratings decline unexpectedly, as occurred in 2001
with Californian utilities or in 1997 with Asian sovereigns, banks will not have the capital in place in advance of the event. Thus the trend -following behaviour of ratings will exacerbate, not reduce, the risk of financial crisis and contagion as banks will be undercapitalised when market conditions are most difficult.
2. Basel II will raise the cost of capital in developing countries. The new capital adequacy framework will stunt the growth of firms in developing countries by raising their cost of capital relative to firms in the wealthy countries. The new framework raises the cost of capital in several ways. First, it allocates a higher risk weighting to non-rated assets than rated-assets. Over 80 percent of rated corporations and 70 percent of rated banks are located in OECD countries, and a higher per capita income is associated with higher ratings. 12 By default, most firms in emerging markets are unrated and so loans to these borrowers will accrue a higher capital charge which will be passed on to borrowers. A World Bank study found 581 OECD-based industrial firms would see their cost of capital decline by 1 percent under the new framework, whereas only 15 non-OECD firms would pay less (Ferri et al. 2000, p. 6) . Instead, non-OECD borrowers would face an average increase of 1.5 percent. In the banking sector, the disparity is even greater with OECD banks paying 2.4 percent more as compared to 6.4 percent for non-OECD banks. This higher cost of capital will create an incentive for borrowers in developing countries to seek other means of financing which are potentially risk-enhancing, such as offbalance sheet financing (as implicated in Enron's collapse), use of financial derivatives, or borrowing from unregulated non-bank financial companies. It will also create disincentives to adopt more sound risk assessments, increasing the volatility of emerging market banks' capital requirements, and worsening the availability of credit to cash-strapped firms in a crisis. In the past, this combination of factors created financial crises which ended with large bail-outs from the rich countries who were affected by contagion. Second, non-US borrowers are sensitive to the rating on sovereign debt, which usually sets the rating ceiling for all firms in its jurisdiction.
This sovereign ceiling penalises well-managed firms located in countries with a low sovereign rating. This sovereign ceiling becomes more punitive when you consider that studies have found that sovereign ratings of low-income countries are typically downgraded excessively relative to OECD countries, and that bank and non-bank ratings in these low-income countries did not recover when the sovereign rating was upgraded (Ferri et al. 2000) .
3. Rating agencies lack economic accountability. Implicit in the idea of incorporating bond ratings into a system of global regulation is the view that these private agencies will be held accountable for their judgements and their mistakes (Karacadag and Taylor, 2000, 27-34) . Up to now, rating agencies have not been held accountable under the law for negligent behaviour, despite attempts to hold them accountable following the collapse of Orange County and other public and private entities (Husisian, 1990) . The rating agencies have been able to avoid financial liability by claiming that they are offering only an opinion on creditworthiness, not a measurement, allowing them to defer prosecution under freedom of speech statutes such as the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Whereas the accountancy profession has been held liable under Generally Agreed Accountancy Principles (GAAP), no parallel exists for credit ratings and any attempt to standardise ratings in this way has been resisted by the rating agencies. This lack of a common standard makes it difficult for a regulatory agency or a court to establish an independent benchmark for measuring a rating agency's performance. However, even if the rating agencies were found liable for negligence in their duties, they would not have the financial capital available to settle such disputes without rapidly going bankrupt. As a result, the cost of rating agency failure would continue to fall on investors, or on taxpayers following a government-sponsored bail-out. Such was the case during the Asian financial crisis (King 2001 ).
4. Ratings agencies have authority but lack political accountability. Rating agencies enjoy an "accountability gap" (Kerwer 2002 ). Rating agencie s are hybrid forms of authority, operating between the state and the market, which have acquired public authority due to their professional expertise, their specialist knowledge, their reputation and acceptance by market actors (Sinclair, 1994a (Sinclair, , 1994b (Sinclair, and 2000 . As noted, in the US, credit ratings have been explicitly incorporated in regulation since 1931, with ratings restrictions written into laws governing banks, pension funds, insurers, broker dealers and mutual funds (Bank for International Settlements, 2000, 54; Sinclair, 1999, 157) . Ratings are also incorporated into regulation in Canada, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. Despite this official role for ratings, no substantive public oversight of the rating agencies actually exists. They have escaped democratic mechanisms of accountability despite playing a part in the operation of credit markets. This lack of political accountability undermines their legitimacy and has led to calls from the Investment Company Institute, an interest group representing institutional investors, for the supervision and legal accountability of rating agencies (Investment Company Institute, 1998) . The only form of accountability in place is that of market acceptance.
5. Weak institutions in emerging markets will undermine ratings . The reputation of the global rating agencies depends on a track record in the US, where both market and non-market institutions have supported and enhanced their success. Can this track-record be repeated in the context of emerging markets where the judicial system, the supervision of banks, the sophistication of investors and the level of financial disclosure are far different from those in industrialised countries? Under Basel II, domestically certified rating agencies will provide the risk assessment used to determine capital requirements in their jurisdiction. In the future each country can be expected to have a local ratings 'champion' which will compete with the global agencies.
Domestic ratings will risk becoming politicised as private interests lobby in order to be awarded the highest possible rating. Given the evidence of corruption and bribery in many regimes around the world -termed crony-capitalism during the Asian crisis -do international regulators wish to use the outputs from potentially compromised firms to minimise risks to the international financial system?
6. There are incentives for ratings shopping. More generally, the multiplication of ratings for firms combined with the structure of Basel II will create incentives for ratings shopping (Karacadag and Taylor, 2000, 32) . Studies of the existing rating agencies have shown that the smaller agencies consistently provide higher ratings than the global leaders. This problem will only worsen as banks shop around to get the highest ratings available on the market in order to reduce the capital charge on their loans. Any rating agency which does not want to lose market share will be forced to compete in this market.
7. The new system will be unwieldy and create moral hazard. Basel II may look good on paper, but in practice its full implementation will be highly bureaucratic and costly. The external ratings framework is intended as a step towards the internal ratings approach where individual banks determine their own capital allocation. No one doubts that building these proprietary credit risk models will be an expensive and time consuming endeavour, requiring the accumulation of credit risk expertise and vast investment of senior management time. Assuming these obstacles are somehow overcome and the models are put in place, Basel II will still be infeasible for a number of operational reasons. First, adequate historical statistics of the probability of default and the recovery given default do not exist, even among the most sophisticated banks. Second, mapping the internal credit ratings of thousands of individual banks onto a uniform and consistent set of global capital 'buckets' will be a monumental task. The Basel Supervisors will be required to evaluate, test and approve each bank's internal credit risk model before then deciding how to graft the bank's internal ratings onto a global template. The functioning of this system will further require periodic checks to ensure it is being implemented as planned. Third, the completion of these tasks will require the Basel Supervisors to make an equal investment in expertise, management time and resources -often relying on local regulators or central banks to fulfil this role. It is easy to imagine that many banks will be left to their own devices, with loopholes and exotic accounting methods being deployed, in order to generate the lowest possible capital charge. Fourth, this arrangement is fraught with moral hazard, and is not likely to work in practice -particularly in developing countries -given the experience of past failures of banking regulators in even the most developed countries.
8. Negating the Market in Reputation. Institutionalising rating agencies in Basel II will -given the high barriers to entry -undermine the reputational constraint otherwise enforced by the capital market (Partnoy, 1999; Karacadag and Taylor, 2000, 33; White, 2001) . Any degrading of reputational enforcement by market operatives will loosen inhibitions on inflating ratings to satisfy issuers. A complacent, parasitic rating industry will result.
While market participants agree that regulators are constantly playing catch up with financial market developments, private actors need to see a return from moving to the new regulatory framework in order to have an incentive to adopt it. Currently, these private actors see only higher costs and increased competition resulting from the current proposals. This approach to making regulatory policy will not lead to the creation of a safer, global financial system. As a result, the Basel II process is in deadlock. The Committee are unwilling to re-work or reduce the proposals given the significant work that has gone into producing them. Instead, the Committee is trying to address the concerns of individual interest groups, at the cost of increased complexity that will render the new Accord unworkable. The real cost of this process will be a riskier financial architecture that encourages private actors to find new ways around the rules. In other words, through this political process the main principle behind a new capital adequacy accord is likely to be lost.
If the process could be re-started from the beginning, how might Basel II proceed in order to reach a successful conclusion? We argue the answer is to start small, focussing on minimum capital requirements and working out a more appropriate mapping of risk and capital that provides incentives for market actors to implement the new Accord. The detail of the Accord is crucial, such as the role assigned for external ratings, the definition of risk buckets, the treatment of unrated entities, and the determining of implementation incentives facing users.
We argue that the Basel Committee should be less ambitious. The new Accord should start small and focus on problems with the 1988 Accord, such as the perception amongst G10 bank supervisors that the financial industry was innovating 'around' the Accord via securitization, credit derivatives and similar instruments (Karacadag and Taylor, 2000, 13) . The Committee should also
give more attention to the calculation of minimum capital requirements addressed in Pillar 1. A shortcoming of the minimum capital requirements under the 1988 Accord is the unequal treatment of OECD vs. non-OECD borrowers. This distortion has been clearly identified, with the worst fears played out during the Asian financial crisis. Given that membership in the OECD was never meant to be an indication of the ability to repay a bank loan, policy makers should resolve to reform this distortion in the 1988 Accord. A simple framework would be to replace the current treatment based on membership in the OECD with the use of external ratings as proposed in Basel II. In other words, loans to sovereign borrowers would incur capital charges in line with the sovereign's credit ratings, not their membership of the OECD. While Pillars 2 and 3 of Basel II deal with substantive issues, these issues should be left off the table until this first fault of the 1988 Accord is addressed.
Second, the more contentious issue relates to the treatment of private sector borrowers and the calibration of the risk buckets used to assign capital in the current proposal. The choice of which rating categories to include in any given risk bucket under the current proposal does not reflect the documented history of ratings defaults and the ratings migration of borrowers. For example, S&P's analysis suggests that the current system will leave banks undercapitalised (S&P 2001, p.4) . Instead of arbitrarily grouping different external ratings into incompatible risk buckets, regulators should focus on the principle that capital charges should be allocated based on the underlying risk of default. Capital charges should rise as the risk of default rises. This principle has been violated under the current proposal as categories of ratings with widely differing default probabilities are included as the same risk. Reshuffling risk buckets to add more 'granularity' and to bring them in line with the default history of credit ratings would be a second step to a new Accord.
Third, a major weakness with Basel II is that it still does not adequately address the issue of unrated entities. The current treatment is unsatisfactory for all parties, as corporations with a rating of BBand lower incur a 150 percent capital charge, while unrated borrowers have a 100 percent capital charge. This classification creates a disincentive for riskier borrowers to get a rating if they have reason to believe their rating will be below BB-. The new Accord should encourage borrowers to get a rating, by forcing riskier entities to bear higher capital charges. At the same time, unrated entities should not be punished for the fact that they have not required a credit rating. The solution would be to create an incentive for unrated entities to gain a rating, by phasing in higher capital charges over time. At the end of some predetermined phase-in period, unrated entities would incur the highest capital charge. This arrangement would provide an incentive for these borrowers to get a rating, while not punishing them in the short term for a lack of rating. The constraint on this process will be the ability of the rating agencies to provide these new ratings. In all likelihood, this phase-in process may require up to 5 years to complete. If the end result is a safer financial system, it is worth the wait.
V. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BASEL II
This discussion of Basel II has so far ignored the political economy question of 'who benefits from a new capital adequacy accord?'. This question goes to the heart of the problem, as it focuses on the incentives facing the different actors for agreeing and implementing a new international regulatory framework. To date, the saga of 'the good tailors of Basel" is one of rent seeking preventing the provision of public goods (The Economist 2002) . While there is widespread consensus that the 1988 Accord is flawed, no one can agree on how to fix it due to contesting private interests that undermined the public agenda. Vested interests such as banks and banking groups, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), borrowers in developing countries, unrated borrowers and the credit rating agencies are all focussed on the negative implications for their businesses.
Basel II will be costly for banks to implement, and will benefit some institutions at the expense of others. Banks expect to incur higher capital charges under Basel II, as well as high costs in terms of management time, staffing and IT expenses in order to implement the new Accord (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2001). The Swiss universal bank Credit Suisse has estimated that the cost of Basel II for the world's 30,000 banks will be $2.5 trillion over five years, costs they warn will be passed on to consumers (Credit Suisse 2001). The IMF is also critical of the complexity of the proposals, arguing that they have been written with the most sophisticated banks in mind. As a result, they may not be realistic for all banks in all countries and some banks will benefit while others will not (International Monetary Fund 2001) . Finally, Basel II will encourage an uneven playing field by offering a competitive advantage to financial services firms not covered by the Accord, namely investment banks, brokers, asset managers and finance companies, who will benefit at the expense of the regulated banks.
Borrowers will suffer. SMEs argue that they will pay a higher cost to borrow due to the higher capital charges related to loans to this sector. Germany is particularly worried, as Basel II penalises long-term bank lending that is the backbone of borrowing by the Mittelstand companies. Developing countries will be hurt due to the relative absence of external ratings. Unrated borrowers are assigned a higher risk weighting under the new proposals, which will lead borrowers in many developing countries to be penalised relative to the rich countries (Asiamoney 2001) . This treatment has not been overlooked by the IMF, which stressed in its submission the need for a level playing field in capital charges that would not be systematically biased against any class of borrowers (International
Monetary Fund 2001).
Finally, the credit rating agencies themselves -who stand to see a significant increase in business as a result of Basel II -express reluctance to have their ratings incorporated into regulation. Both
Moody's and S&P fear the problem of ratings shopping, as well as the risk that regulatory competition will erode rating agency objectivity (Moody's 2001b (Moody's , S&P 2001 . They see a risk that countries will use national recognition to reward and punish the credit rating agencies, with the creation of national rating agencies of questionable credibility diminishing investor confidence in this product. The end result will be greater competition for the main rating agencies and an inevitable erosion of the reputation of credit ratings to the detriment of the leading firms.
This debate over Basel II may be analysed from the point of view of the theory of redistributive cooperation which seeks to explain the forces that lead to the creation of international institutions (Oatley and Nabors 1998; Richards 1999) . The theory of redistributive cooperation explains the creation of international institutions by focusing on demand and supply. This theory argues that actors must receive private rents from a new institution in order to have an incentive to deal with it.
The new institution in turn provides a public good, that is otherwise underprovided by the markets due to problems of collective action and free riding.
The demand for a new international institution comes from domestic interest groups that see an opportunity to capture rents from abroad. In the case of Basel II, the U.S. credit rating agencies will capture rents in the form of expanded requirements for their services by all participants in the bank lending markets. Given the number of unrated entities in this market, the potential further revenues from this business are large, but few actors are in a position to provide this service in a timely fashion other than the major US rating agencies. Banks located in higher-rated countries will also benefit as they will receive favourable capital treatment relative to competitors in lower-rated countries.
Neither of these actors will have an incentive to adopt a new Accord if they foresee a decline in their profitability or an increase in competition.
The supply for a new international institution is provided by politicians in the member states who view international institutions as a means to extract wealth from the international sector that can be redistributed domestically to their constituents (Oatley and Nabors 1998, p.40) . While regulators may draft the new capital accord, in order to be implemented politicians in the member states must pass the enacting legislation. Germany has made this point clear in its threat to veto the new proposals at the EU level. To be successful, policy makers in the wealthy nations must see a benefit from the provision of more rigorous capital standards. At the international level, this appears to be the case. The wealthy countries have been forced to come to the aid of sovereign borrowers in Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe over the past decade following currency crises that have ultimately been tied to faulty domestic banking systems. Wealthy countries have distributed significant sums through bail-outs following these crises, but they have also faced the threat of financial contagion through the international banking system leading to the collapse of their domestic banks. These two sources of international rents provide strong incentives for the richest countries to sew together the obvious holes in the current Accord. The main obstacle to the current Accord comes from other domestic actors who see the costs outweighing the benefits. This dynamic needs to be addressed for a new proposal to be successful.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
As we have argued, rating agencies offer to solve the asymmetric information problem between borrowers and creditors. In providing this function, the rating agencies adjust the 'ground rules' of international capital markets, thereby reshaping the internal organisation and behaviour of those institutions seeking funds. Rating agencies' views on what is considered 'acceptable' shape the decision making and actions of those dependent on ratings, due in large part to the inclusion of ratings in regulation. This process of interaction between private actors in the capital markets narrows the expectations of creditors and debtors to a set of norms, shared amongst all parties. At the same time, it limits the scope of concrete policy initiatives available to policymakers who are accountable for the stability of global finance. Global change makes the public -private distinction at the heart of traditional studies of public policy increasingly invalid. As this article shows, public policy can also be made by private institutions or networks when the outputs of these private institutions shape the basic norms which produce action in governments and business organisations.
Rating agencies were examined in this article as an example of the private making of public policy.
Their specific structural power -and hence their influence on public policy -is derived first, from the disintermediation trend in global finance and the asymmetric information problem it produces in capital markets, and second, from their internal construction (and outward behaviour) as purveyors of judgements perceived as endogenous and therefore legitimate by other actors. This structural power is made concrete when policy makers incorporate the decisions of these private actors into regulation at the domestic and the international level.
The rating agencies see themselves as "quasi-regulatory institutions" (O'Neill interview). They are well placed to defer or modify government chal lenges to their authority, as the hesitancy with which any new effort -including Basel II -to further pull them into regulation demonstrates. Nevertheless, a significant feature of their relationship with public authority is the tendency of government to use quasi-regulatory outputs like these as substitutes for government action. This quasi-regulation poses increased risks because the incentives mapped out above do not suggest a framework that will bring greater stability to global finance. Just as Basel I created incentives for behaviour in the financial markets which undermined the intent of the initial Capital Adequacy Accord, the political economy of bond rating, as analysed here, may be the weakest link in the Basel II proposals.
